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Toward the Restorative Constitution: 
A Restorative Justice Critique of 
Anti-Gang Public Nuisance 
Injunctions 
ByJOANW. HOWARTH* 
INTRODUCTION 
Gang members, all of whom live elsewhere, congregate on 
lawns, on sidewalks, and in front of apartment complexes at all 
hours of the day and night. They display a casual contempt for 
notions of law, order, and decency-openly drinking, smoking 
dope, sniffing toluene, and even snorting cocaine laid out in 
neat lines on the hoods of residents' cars. The people who live 
in Rocksprings are subjected to loud talk, loud music, vulgarity, 
profanity, brutality, fistfights and the sound of gunfire echoing 
in the streets. Gang members take over sidewalks, driveways, 
carports, apartment parking areas, and impede traffic on the 
public thoroughfares to conduct their drive-up drug bazaar. 
Murder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and 
battery, vandalism, arson, and theft are commonplace.! 
How should we respond to young people, gang members, 
terrorizing a neighborhood in this way? San Jose prosecutors 
responded by obtaining and enforcing a broad injunction against the 
Varrio Sureno Treces and Varrio Sureno Locos gangs and their 
• Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. I thank Ayana Cuevas (UC Davis, 
2000) for excellent research assistance, Christine Pagano and Maria Ontiveros for helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this work, and the faculty at the William S. Boyd School 
of Law, UNLV, for a thoughtful discussion of many of these ideas. This project was 
finished while I was the Scholar in Residence at the Boalt Center for Social Justice, an 
opportunity for which I am very grateful. 
1. People ex reL Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1100 (1997) (describing the 
Rocksprings neighborhood of San Jose and justifying the anti-gang public nuisance 
injunction ordered to protect the residents of Rocksprings), cert. denied sub nom. 
Gonzalez v. Gallo, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997). 
[717] 
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members, based on the finding that the gangs' activities constituted a 
public nuisance to the people of Rocksprings.2 California prosecutors 
have sought such anti-gang public nuisance injunctions since 1987.3 
Their constitutionality was in doubt for ten years until People ex reI. 
Gallo v. Acuna,4 in which the California Supreme Court upheld the 
injunction imposed to protect the residents of Rocksprings. The 
California court found that the needs of a community overtaken by 
criminality justified bypassing the criminal justice system.s The 
Acuna opinion champions the anti-gang injunction as a lawful and 
important means to hold the gang members accountable and restore 
community to Rocksprings. 
This Article critiques anti-gang public nuisance injunctions 
through the lens of restorative justice principles. The rhetorical 
justification for anti-gang injunctions is strikingly similar to the 
rhetoric of the restorative justice movement. Restorative justice rests 
on the tenets that any crime is injurious, and that the best response is 
one that heals the injuries caused to the victim, the community, and 
the offender.6 The anti-gang public nuisance injunctions share 
2. See id. The two targeted gangs were variously known as Varrio Sureno Town, 
Varrio Sureno Treces (VST), or Varrio Sureno Locos (VSL). 
3. See Christopher S. Yoo, Comment, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal 
Street Gangs as Public Nuisances, 89 Nw. u.L. REv. 213, 215, 217 (1994); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 50-93. 
4. 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997). 
5. For commentary on Acuna, see Raffy Astvasadoorian, Note, California'S Two-
Prong Attack Against Gang Crime and Violence: The Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act and Anti-Gang Injunctions, 19 J. Juv. L. 272 (1998); Rebecca Allen, Note, 
People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna: (Ab)using California'S Nuisance Law to Control Gangs, 25 
W. ST. U. L. REV. 257 (1998); Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local 
Governments, and the Battle for Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 477 (1993); 
Bergen Herd, Note, Injunctions as a Tool to Fight Gang-related Problems in California 
after People ex rei Gallo v. Acuna: A Suitable Solution?, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 29 
(1998); Edson McClellan, Casenote, People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna: Pulling in the Nets on 
Criminal Street Gangs, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 343 (1998); Julie Gannon Shoop, Gang 
Warfare: Legal Battle Pits Personal Liberty Against Public Safety, 34 TRIAL 12 (Mar. 
1998); Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public 
Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REv. 409 
(1999); Mindy Yaeger, Note, People ex reI. Gallo v. Acuna: Cities Allowed a New Weapon 
in Their Arsenal for the Crackdown on Gangs, 19 WHITTIER L. REv. 595 (1998); Randall 
Kennedy, Guilty by Association, AM. PROSPECf, May-June 1997, at 66; Daniel J. 
Sharfstein, Gangbusters: Enjoining the Boys in the 'Hood, AM. PROSPECf, May-June 1997, 
at 58; see also Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of 
Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1129, 1173-76 
(1999) (citing Acuna as an example of constitutional interpretation successfully 
acknowledging community needs through contextual "Tailoring"). 
6. The Office of Juvenile Justice of the Department of Justice sets out the principles 
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significant similarities with typical restorative justice programs: both 
are deviations from traditional criminal court (or even juvenile court) 
models; both privilege participation of affected communities; both re-
conceive lawbreaking as injury; and both, at least in theory, are based 
on notions of redress of those injuries. Further, both provoke serious 
opposition from civillibertarians.7 Fundamentally, though, the anti-
gang public nuisance injunctions undermine the promise of 
restorative justice as deeply as they weaken traditional rights-based 
protections, and the betrayal of the goals of restorative justice may be 
of even greater consequence. 
Part I of this Article describes the fundamental principles of 
restorative justice, referencing some specific projects, to introduce the 
vocabulary and values of restorative justice. Part II describes anti-
gang public nuisance injunctions. Part III critiques the anti-gang 
public nuisance injunctions using the restorative justice lens. Building 
on that critique, Part IV describes restorative justice for Rocksprings. 
Part V begins an argument for a Restorative Constitution, whereby 
constitutional protections-re-imagined as affirmative, community-
based values, rather than merely defensive individual-based rights-
can accommodate and even embrace restorative justice goals, themes, 
and programs. 
I. Restorative Justice 
Restorative justice is a modern movement8 with ancient roots9 
of restorative justice as follows: 
"Crime is injury. Crime hurts individual victims, communities, and juvenile offenders and 
creates an obligation to make things right. All parties should be a part of the response to 
the crime, including the victim if he or she wishes, the community, and the juvenile 
offender. The victim's perspective is crucial to deciding how to repair the harm caused by 
the crime. Accountability for the juvenile offender means accepting responsibility and 
acting to repair the harm done. The community is responsible for the well-being of all its 
members, including both the victim and the offender." 
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
GUIDE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE BALANCED AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE MODEL 5 
(1998); see also infra text accompanying notes 8-49 (describing restorative justice programs 
and principles). 
7. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal 
Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994) (libertarian critique of some 
restorative justice programs); Werdegar, supra note 5 (libertarian critique of anti-gang 
public nuisance injunctions). 
8. See Gordon Bazemore, Beyond Retribution: Creative Retribution, in 
RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds., 1975) (crediting 
Albert Eglash with having introduced the term "restorative justice"); Gordon Bazemore, 
Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration: Restorative Justice and Earned 
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and adherents around the globe.lO Restorative justice advocates invite 
us to reject the basics of the criminal justice adversarial system, of 
crime as violation of law, and of the fundamental distinctions between 
criminal and civil law.l1 According to John Braithwaite, the core 
values of restorative justice are "healing rather than hurting, moral 
learning, community participation and community caring, respectful 
dialogue, forgiveness, responsibility, apology, and making amends.,,12 
Braithwaite describes restorative justice as "a process of bringing 
together the individuals who have been affected by an offense and 
having them agree on how to repair the harm caused by the crime. 
The purpose is to restore victims, restore offenders, and restore 
communities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is juSt.,,13 As so 
described, restorative justice is the most hopeful, least cynical, and 
least co-opted aspect of the victims' right movement.14 Braithwaite 
Redemption, in CIVIC REPENTANCE, at 85 n. 14 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1999). 
9. See Elmar G. M. Weitekamp, The History of Restorative Justice, in RESTORING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 75, 102 (Lode Walgrave & Gordon Bazemore eds., 1999). 
10. See, e.g., Douglas B. Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law - A Redemptive 
Opportunity,27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1583 (2000) (discussing restorative criminal defense 
practice); Frederick W. Gay, Restorative Justice and the Prosecutor, 27 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1651 (2000) (advocating for restorative justice by prosecutors); Leena Kurki, 
Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235 (2000) 
(describing roots, practices, and evaluations of restorative justice programs in the U.S., 
Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere); David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal 
Justice System: If It Belongs, Then Why is It so Hard To Find?, 27 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 
1663 (2000) (advocating for restorative justice by prosecutors); David M. Lerman, 
Restoring Dignity, Effecting Justice, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 20, 20-21 (Fall 1999) (describing 
successful restorative justice processes in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa); Kent Roach, 
Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671, 706-15 (1999) 
(optimistic assessment of "circles," non-punitive model of restorative justice for U.S. and 
Canada). 
11. See Gordon Bazemore in CIVIC REPENTANCE, supra note 8, at 45; Gordon 
Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court: 
Retributive or Restorative Responses to Youth Crime,41 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 296, 298 
(1995) ("A restorative model would expand less punitive, less costly, and less stigmatizing 
sanctioning methods by involving the community and victims in sanctioning processes, 
thereby elevating the role of victims and victimized communities and giving priority to 
reparation, direct offender accountability to victims, and conflict resolution."). 
12. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic 
Accounts,25 CRIME & JUST. 1,5 (1999). 
13. John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic or 
Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999). 
14. For leading discussions of victims' rights in criminal proceedings, see Lynne 
Henderson, Crime & Punishment: Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1596 
(1996), reviewing GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995); Lynne Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. 
REv. 937 (1985). For a description of restorative justice as an outgrowth of the victims' 
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and Philip Pettit explain that the remedy to the' problem of victim 
irrelevance in criminal prosecutions would seem to be to give back to 
the victim the particular crime.IS In restorative justice principles, both 
the victim and the offender are necessary participants in a process of 
making amends.16 Thus restorative justice is directly at odds with the 
adversary system; a system to find or construct common ground is not 
an adversary system. 
Restorative justice programs address a variety of criminal 
behaviors around the globe. Noteworthy processes identified as 
restorative justice initiatives include the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa/7 victim-offender mediation and 
reconciliation programs in the United States and elsewhere/8 Navaho 
Peacemaking/9 and family conferences in the United States, Canada, 
and New Zealand.20 Within United States legal systems, restorative 
rights movement, see Brown, supra note 7. 
15. John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, Comment: Republican Criminology and Victim 
Advocacy, 28 L. & SOC'y REv. 765, 771 (1994). 
16. Cf. Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1009, 
1016 (1999) ("an apology is a 'commodity' which only the offender can produce"; the 
'market' for apology is monopolistic-the injured party cannot get that apology elsewhere. 
The same applies to forgiveness: It is a commodity best obtained from the injured party."). 
17. See, e.g., Abdullah Omar, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Accounting 
for the Past, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 5, 14 (1998) (identifying Commission as 
restorative justice project); see generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 47,49 (1997) (analyzing Truth and Reconciliation Commission). 
18. See MARK UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994). 
19. See Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation's Peacemaker Division: An Integrated, 
Community-Based Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 297 (199912000); 
Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo 
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999) (placing Navajo Peacemaking within restorative 
justice); Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion, Navajo Restorative Justice: The Law of Equality 
and Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 69 (Burt 
Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES] at 157, 
160 (describing traditional Navajo law as "a healing process that either restores good 
relationships among people or, if they do not have good relations to begin with, fosters 
and nourishes a healthy environment."). For a caution about transferring Navaho 
Peacemaking principles or practices to non-Indian systems, see Carole E. Goldberg, 
Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Applied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. 
L. REV. 1003 (1997). 
20. See, e.g., Mark Umbreit & Howard Zehr, Restorative Family Group Conferences: 
Differing Models and Guidelines for Practice, FED. PROBATION (Sept. 1996); Frederick 
W.M. McElrea, The New Zealand Youth Court: A Model for Use with Adults, in 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 69. For discussions of specific 
restorative justice projects, see Curt Taylor Griffiths, Sanctioning and Healing: Restorative 
Justice in Canadian Aboriginal Communities, 20 INTER'L. J. OF COMPo AND APPLIED 
CRIM. JUST. 195 (1996); Gord Richardson, Burt Galaway & Michelle Joubert, The 
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justice principles have been translated into program initiatives 
primarily in the juvenile justice context.21 Juvenile justice appears to 
be a prime site for restorative justice experiments because of the now 
diminished but still relatively greater emphasis on rehabilitation of 
juvenile offenders, and the associated hope of preventing juveniles 
from becoming entrenched in the criminal justice system.22 
Juvenile justice conferencing in New Zealand provides a model 
of restorative justice with particularly widespread acceptance and 
influence. In this model, once wrongdoing is admitted, a conference 
is convened, generally moderated by a police officer, with both the 
offender and the victim. Each of the major participants, the offender 
and the victim, is invited to bring to the conference the people most 
able to provide support. In other words, family or friends of both 
participate. Conferencing has succeeded in spite of strong resistance 
from lawyers, and has gained equally strong support from the police. 
The offender hears directly from the victim about the injury the 
offender has caused and what is needed to make amends. The 
"community" is represented not only by the police officer, but also by 
the people brought to the conference by both the victim and the 
offender. When conferencing works, the presence of the victim's 
supporters enables the victim to confront and communicate with the 
offender, and the presence of the offender's supporters enables the 
offender to accept responsibility and be held accountable for not only 
the original injury, but whatever restorative remedy is agreed upon.23 
Proponents of restorative justice make both moral and pragmatic 
Restorative Resolutions Project: An Alternative to Incarceration, id. at 209; Barry Stuart, 
Circle Sentencing in Canada: A Partnership of the Community and the Criminal Justice 
System, id. at 291. 
21. See, e.g., Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 11; Amanda Paye, Communities 
Taking Control of Crime: Incorporating the Conferencing Model into the United States 
Juvenile Justice System, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J. 161 (1999). For an excellent 
introduction to the use of restorative justice for crime committed by juveniles, see OFFICE 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PLANNING, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BALANCED 
AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: A FRAMEWORK FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY (August 1997) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK]. 
22. See REsTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH 
CRIME (G. Bazemore & L. Walgrave eds., 1999); Gordon Bazemore, Three Paradigms for 
Juvenile Justice, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECfIVES, supra note 19, at 37; Brown, supra 
note 7, at 1265 n. 70; Frederick W. M. McElreas, The New Zealand Youth Court: A Model 
for Use with Adults, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECfIVES, supra note 19, at 69. But see 
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform,79 MINN. L. REv. 965, 1095 (1995) (cautioning that restorative justice might be 
simply the "latest fad" in juvenile justice). 
23. See Braithwaite, supra note 12, at 15-17; McEireas, supra note 22, at 69. 
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arguments for it. Many argue that restorative justice is more effective 
in making us safe from violence than current regimes of retribution.24 
John Braithwaite points out that "the research literature of 
victimology instructs us that it is incorrect to expect that tougher 
sentences will leave crime victims, the police, or citizens any more 
satisfied with the justice system.,,25 On a more theoretical level, some 
proponents claim that restorative justice addresses deconstructionist 
critiques of justice by recognizing the offender and the victim in their 
individuality.26 Important, and strong theoretical support for 
restorative justice comes from republican27 and communitarian28 
thinkers. 
Braithwaite has argued that "[r]estorative justice became a 
global social movement in the 1990s as a result of learning from 
indigenous practices of restorative justice the ways in which 
individualistic Western victim-offender mediation was impoverished.29 
Braithwaite suggests that the "radically communitarian" traditions of 
the New Zealand Maori and North American Native people lead to 
more effective restorative practices,30 that "material reparation [is] 
much less important than emotional or symbolic reparation,,,31 and 
that justice must be "intertwined with love and caring.,,32 
Liberal, feminist, and critical race critics, however, express 
24. For discussions of the theoretical underpinnings of the efficacy of restorative 
justice, see, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1737-1742; see also John O. Haley, Apology 
and Pardon: Learning from Japan, in CIVIC REPENTANCE, supra note 8, at 97 (discussing 
role of apology in reducing Japan's crime rate since World War II). 
25. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1737 (citing Julian V. Roberts & Loretta J. Stalans, 
Crime, Criminal Justice, and Public Opinion, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT 31,47-50 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). 
26. See, e.g., Barbara Hudson, Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Sexual and Racial 
Violence, 25 J. OF L. & SOC'y 237, 241 & n. 18 (1998). 
27. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A 
REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990); PHILIP PETTIT, REpUBLICANISM: 
A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997). 
28. See, e.g., Bazemore, Civic Repentance, in CIVIC REPENTANCE, supra note 8, at viii 
("My main thesis is that we should adopt the religious concept of repentance into our civic 
culture."); id. at vii ("the lack of opportunities for full restoration [for offenders] exacts 
social costs."). 
29. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1743. 
30. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1743-44. 
31. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1744. Braithwaite asserts that "[v]ictims often 
wanted an apology more than compensation. Forgiveness from their families was often 
more important to the restoration of offenders than anything else." Id. 
32 Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1744. Braithwaite and Philip Pettit describe 
"alternative model accountability conferences" as appropriate whenever criminal 
defendants "decline to deny" their guilt. Braithwaite & Pettit, supra note 15, at 771. 
724 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:717 
reservations about restorative justice models. They charge that the 
informality of typical restorative justice programs can eliminate 
crucial rights,33 reinforce pre-existing subordinating relationships,34 
insidiously enlarge the reach of the state,35 dangerously reduce the 
protection of the state,36 reproduce inequality of results,37 and obscure 
systemic contexts and causes for the offense.38 Rather than healing 
the victim as promised, restorative justice processes can pressure 
victims to forgive their attackers too easily,39 causing further 
victimization, including violence.4o These concerns are grounds for 
33. See, e.g., Jenny Bargen, Kids, Cops, Courts, Conferencing and Children's Rights-
A Note of Perspectives, 2 AUSTRALIAN J. OF HUM. RIGHTS 209 (1996); Brown, supra note 
7, at 1287-91 (discussing absence of such protections as right of confidentiality and right to 
counsel); J. Stubbs, 'Communitarian' Conferencing and Violence Against Women: A 
Cautionary Note, in WIFE ASSAULT AND THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
260 (Mariana Valverde, L. MacLeod & K. Johnson, eds., 1995); Daniel W. Van Ness, 
Legal Issues of Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE 
HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 263 (G. Bazemore & L. Walgrave eds., 1999); K. Warner, The 
Rights of the Offender in Family Conferences, in FAMILY CONFERENCING AND JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: THE WAY FORWARD OR MISPLACED OPTIMISM? (C. Alder & J. Wundersitz 
eds., 1994). 
34. See, e.g., Stephen Hooper & Ruth Busch, Domestic Violence and the Restorative 
Justice Initiatives: The Risks of a New Panacea, 4 WAIKATO L. REv. 101 (1996). 
35. See, e.g., George Pavlich, The Power of Community Mediation: Government and 
Formation of Self-Identity, 30 L. & SOC'y REv. 707,711 (1996) ("explor[ing] mediation as 
a governmentalization (cf. expansion) of state dispute resolution" and noting that critics 
of community mediation charge that it "actually expand(s) and intensif(ies) state control" 
in a particularly "insidious" way because "on the surface, [it] appears to be a process of 
retraction") (citing Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law and Community: The Changing 
Nature of State Power in Late Capitalism, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOL 1: 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 262 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982». 
36. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7; Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: 
Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2000). 
37. See, e.g., Evelyn Zellerer, Community-Based Justice and Violence against Women: 
Issues of Gender and Race, 20 INTER'L. J. OF COMPo & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 233, 236 
(1996) (arguing that community-based justice programs need to be assessed in terms of 
inclusion of women, safety and protection of women, and power and control). 
38. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 38-73; Paul McCold, Restorative Justice and the 
Role of Community, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECfIVES, supra note 19, at 85, 89; see also 
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Social Justice, 63 SASK. L. REV. 185, 188 (2000) 
(noting that "[o]nce colonialism, slavery, and immigration has ruptured the lives of 
Indigenous peoples, all forms of justice, including the most plural forms of restorative 
justice, serve as a threat to social justice for First Nations .... "). 
39. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 85-88 (describing what she calls the "cheap-
justice problem"); see generally ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICf 
AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 51(1999) (noting emptiness of 
race apologies which rest on "inadequate acknowledgements or have no material effect on 
the participants' relationship" ). 
40. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 80-82 (describing women injured immediately 
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caution, but not rejection, of restorative justice approaches. Surely 
most of the same objections are valid challenges to current criminal 
and juvenile justice systems; the anti-gang public nuisance injunctions 
are reminders of the vast difference between the theoretical rights of 
our current system and the reality of implementation. 
Further, restorative justice offers potentially significant 
responses to several important critiques of current criminal justice 
practices.41 Three particular points support a hopeful exploration of 
restorative justice. First, restorative justice might offer a practical 
program to dislodge some harmful but deeply entrenched socially 
constructed identities of criminals and communities. Policies about 
crime and punishment are influenced by powerful but ambiguous 
ideas about community and individual responsibility, both of which 
are deeply class-based and racialized. Socially constructed knowledge 
about the individual who is the criminal and the community that 
deserves protection are bounded by largely unspoken class, gender, 
and race identities.42 For example, the anti-gang injunctions target 
Latino and African-American young people, subjecting them to guilt 
based on group association and identifying them as distinct and 
separate from the deserving community. In this, the anti-gang public 
nuisance injunctions ratify and reinforce class- and race-based 
constructions of crime and community.43 
Meaningful restorative justice offers at least the possibility of 
cracking through entrenched racialized barriers to justice. 
Restorative justice programs use case-by-case identification and 
involvement of and engagement by the truly relevant communities, 
the people closest to the victim and to the offender. In this way 
restorative justice programs disperse power to outsider communities, 
after Peacemaking). 
41. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice As Environmental Justice, 1 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 , 28 (1997) (suggesting a transformative environmental justice 
approach to criminal justice in part because the civil rights approach, with its principled 
focus on individual defendants, "does not address the very real toll that crime takes on 
neighborhoods and families"). 
42. See, e.g., Joan W. Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, 1 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUSTICE 97, 102-14 (1997) (discussing widespread associations of Black men with 
criminal behavior); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) 
(criticizing generalized suspicions linking men of color to crime); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, 
THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, 
POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MICROAGGRESSIONS (1998) (criticizing widespread 
associations of blacks with lawbreaking). 
43. See, e.g. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
IN AMERICA (1995). 
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and acknE>wledge and build upon the complex identities of specific 
individuals and communities. These aspects of restorative justice 
directly challenge the racialized and class-based social constructions 
of crime and criminals that inform so much of current criminal and 
juvenile justice law and policy. 
Second, restorative justice offers the possibility of feminist re-
visioning of crime and punishment.44 Specifically, restorative justice 
principles are consistent with the insights of relational feminism, 
because they build on the goal of reinforcing positive connections 
between individuals and communities rather than reinforcing the 
isolated individualism of traditional liberal legal thougheS Certainly 
feminist interventions in criminal justice have not always relied on 
restorative justice principles,46 and, feminists are among those raising 
cautions about potential dangers of restorative justice.47 In spite of 
those warnings, I join those feminists intrigued by the possibilities of 
restorative justice.48 
Third, today's criminal justice system is so far removed from 
44. See, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Criminal Law and Justice System Practices as Racist, 
White, and Racialized, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 431, 433 (1994) ("If crime and justice 
system policies in the United States are to move from a largely penalizing, criminalizing, 
and warehousing model to a more humane system that envisions welfare, restoration, and 
reintegration as its principles, then we must radically reconfigure conceptions of manhood 
and masculinity"). 
45. E.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 34 (noting the "relational justice" foundation of 
Navajo Peacemaking); Braithwaite & Pettit, Republican Criminology, supra note 32, at 
771 (suggesting consistency between ethic of care and restorative justice conferencing); see 
also Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515, 1517 
(2000) (assuming that the wrong of harm is "the breaking of trust with one's community 
and the injury to the victim as a community member"); id. at 1520 (noting that "the basic 
public trust is necessary for simply leaving the house in the morning"). 
46. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Pettit, Republican Criminology, supra note 15, at 770 n. 1 
(commenting that the "women's movement is becoming a less retributive, less stigmatizing 
social movement"); Kathleen Daly, Men's Violence, Victim Advocacy, and Feminist 
Redress, 28 L. & SOC'Y REv. 777 (1994) (reminding of multiplicity of feminisms). 
47. See, e.g., Stubbs, supra note 33, at 260. 
48. See, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different 
Voices: Some Feminist Questions about Justice, 17 INT'LJ. SOCIOLOGY L. 1 (1989); Angela 
P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 803-04 
(2000); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to Violent 
Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 967, 981(1998). The connections between restorative 
justice and republican principles (see BRAITHWAITE & PETIIT, supra note 27) and 
Habermas' theories of democracy and discourse (see JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN 
FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996); cf. Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic 
Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 33 (1996)) are also intriguing. 
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goals of justice and safety that fundamental change is required. 
Restorative justice offers such a deep rethinking. The court in Acuna 
was willing to jettison cherished individual rights to uphold creative 
responses to aid a community overtaken by crime. Perhaps the same 
openness to creativity can be brought to restorative justice principles 
and programs. Its central role for the victim, combined with concern 
for the offender, brings restorative justice support from all sides of 
the political spectrum, which might mean that restorative justice is 
both transformative and feasible.49 
II. Anti-gang Injunctions 
Although anti-gang public nuisance injunctions cry out for 
criticism on standard civil liberties grounds50 and as a racialized anti-
crime strategy,S! my critique here is based on the principles of 
restorative justice. Inspection of the anti-gang injunctions using 
restorative justice principles underscores the fundamental differences 
between restorative justice methodologies and principles, and 
traditional individual rights-based civil liberties and constitutional 
49. See Braithwaite, Utopian, supra note 13, at 1745-46 (suggesting that the 
effectiveness and increased satisfaction from restorative justice conferencing offer the 
promise of a truly feasible transformation, even in conservative, punitive cultures); Francis 
T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher, & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion about Punishment 
and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 47 (2000) ("there is beginning to be evidence that 
restorative justice is favored by the public"); id., at 45 ("[R]esearch shows that sanctions 
with a restorative quality are strongly embraced by citizens"). 
50. See, e.g., Boga, supra note 5, at 494-502 (arguing that anti-gang injunctions violate 
First Amendment rights of association and free assembly); McClellan, supra note 5, at 373-
78 (arguing that anti-gang injunctions must be limited to individuals actively participating 
or with specific intent to participate in unlawful gang activities); Werdegar, supra note 5 
(arguing that injunctions are unconstitutional on vagueness, guilt by association, and 
procedural due process grounds in addition to being of limited usefulness); Yaeger, supra 
note 5, at 641 (suggesting that anti-gang injunctions should be geographically limited) & 
648-651 (suggesting that anti-gang injunctions must be limited to individuals who have 
committed acts deemed to be public nuisances). But see Gregory S. Walston, Taking the 
Constitution at its Word: A Defense of the Use of Anti-gang Injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 47 (1999) (defense of constitutionality of anti-gang injunctions by California Deputy 
Attorney General). 
51. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: 
A "Magic Mirror' into the Heart of Darkness," 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1138 (1998) (identifying 
anti-gang injunction as "battlefield for Anglos and Mexican Americans to fight for status 
in the U.S. social hierarchy"); Gary Stewart, Note: Black Codes and Broken Windows: The 
Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE LJ. 2249 (1998); cf. 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999) (charging anti-gang 
loitering ordinances reinforce the social meaning of communities of color as law-
breakers). 
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claims. 
Attorneys in the office of Los Angeles City Attorney James 
Hahn invented the anti-gang public nuisance injunction, and filed the 
first such action, People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, in Los Angeles 
Superior Court in 1987.52 The injunction sought against the Playboy 
Gangster Crips was not only the first, but perhaps also the most 
expansive anti-gang public nuisance action attempted. The named 
defendants against whom the injunction was sought were "Playboy 
Gangster Crips, an unincorporated association" and "DOES 1 
through 300, inclusive.,,53 The injunction was sought against "the 
defendant unincorporated association and all of its members, agents, 
servants, employees, and representatives, and all persons acting in 
concert with them.,,54 The order prosecutors wanted would have 
applied to several square miles near La Cienega Boulevard in Los 
Angeles, and would have prevented any two of those unidentified 
three hundred people from being in public together in that area, 
including in public hallways.55 Any of the three hundred defendants 
who were minors were to be ordered not to "loiter" anywhere in 
public between sunset and sunrise unless accompanied by a parent, 
guardian, or a spouse over the age of twenty-one.56 No matter what 
their age, defendants would violate the proposed order by being in 
public anywhere in the area of the injunction for more than five 
52. See People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (L.A. County Super. Ct., 
filed Oct. 26, 1987); Aaron Curtiss, West Side gang members claim crackdown violates their 
rights, L.A. HERALD EXAM., Nov. 15, 1987, at Ai; Paul Feldman, City Attorney to Ask 
Tight Restrictions on Crips Gang, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1987, Pt. 2, at 1; James Hahn, New 
• methods needed to defeat gangs, L.A. HERALD EXAM., Nov. 23, 1987. As a Staff 
Attorney for the ACLU Foundation of Southern California, I represented the ACLU in 
its legal and public opposition to the injunctions. See, e.g., Paul Feldman, Court Rejects 
City Attorney's Bid to Curb Westside Gang's Movements, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1987, Pt. 2, 
at 1. 
53. Complaint, People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (L.A. County 
Super. Ct. filed Oct. 26, 1987). 
54. Preliminary Injunction (Proposed), People v. Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 
118860 (L.A. County Super. Ct.). 
55. The proposed injunction included the following order: "a. Do not congregate in 
groups of two or more upon any public street, avenue, alley, park, public place or place 
open to public view or in any public hallway or public passageway at any time of the day 
or night." Id. at 2. 
56. Id. ("b. If you are a person of under the age of 18 years, do not loiter about any 
public street, avenue, alley, park or other public place between the time of sunset and the 
time of sunrise of the following day, unless accompanied by your parent or legal guardian 
having legal custody and control of your person or your spouse over the age of twenty-one 
years." ). 
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minutes,57 attending a party with other gang members that was 
audible outside the apartment or residence where the party was being 
held,58 or failing to carry government-issued identification at all 
times.59 
In addition to seeking prohibitions against a number of specific 
law violation{)() and a general prohibition against any lawbreaking,61 
the prosecutors also included within the proposed order a provision 
preventing any of the three hundred Doe defendants from refusing 
consent to any personal or vehicle search or seizure.62 The 
prosecutors sought to prohibit a variety of nuisance activities, from 
littering63 to blocking ingress and egress.64 The order sought also 
would have prevented grafitti by prohibiting the possession of 
markers and paint,65 and prevented drug trafficking by prohibiting the 
57. Id. ("c. Do not remain upon any public street, avenue, alley, park or other public 
place or in any place open to public view or in any public hallway or public passage way 
for more than five minutes at any time of the day or night."). 
58. Id. ("d. Do not be present at, or participate in, any party where other gang 
members are present and which is audible beyond the confines of the apartment or 
residence where the party is located."). 
59. Id. ("v. Do not fail to carry valid photo identification issued by the California 
Department of Motor Vehicles or any other governmental agency."). 
60. E.g., id., at 2 ("e. Do not enter or be present upon the private property of another 
without permission"); at 3 ("h. Do not fire or discharge, or cause to be fired or discharged, 
any pellet gun, starter pistol or firearm of any type at any time of the day or night"); at 4 
("k. Do not damage or deface, or cause others to damage or deface, by spray painting or 
otherwise, public property or private property not owned by you"; "n. Do not use or 
possess or consume an alcoholic beverage on any public street, avenue, alley, park, public 
place or place open to public view or in any public hallway or public passageway at any 
time of the day or night"); "r. Do not urinate or defecate upon any public street, avenue, 
alley, park or other public place or in any place open to public view or in any public 
hallway or public passageway."). 
61. Id. ("w. Do not violate any law."). 
62. Id. ("x. As a showing of good faith compliance with the provisions of this order, 
do not refuse to consent to any search of your person or vehicle or to seizure of any 
contraband as defined by this order when requested by any peace officer or probation 
officer."). 
63. Id. at 5 ("s. Do not litter, or cause other persons to litter, upon any public street, 
avenue, alley, park or other public place or in any place open to public view or in any 
public hallway or public passageway."). 
64. Id. ("q. Do not block the free egress or ingress to or from any street, driveway, 
sidewalk, house, building, vehicle or other place."). 
65. Id. at 4 ("1. Do not possess on your person or in a vehicle upon any public street, 
avenue, alley, park, public place or place open to public view or in any public hallway or 
public passageway at any time of the day or night any paint or any marker with an 
application surface greater than one quarter (1/4) inch."). 
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possession of drugs66 or communications equipment,67 the approaching 
of cars,68 or any welcoming of short-term visitors.69 Thus the 
prosecutor's idea was to use the civil law of public nuisance 
abatements to effectively criminalize the low-level, annoying 
behaviors of gang members.70 In this, the public nuisance anti-gang 
injunction is consistent with other "broken windows,,71 or public order 
policing and prosecutorial initiatives, including Chicago's broad anti-
loitering ordinance struck down by the Supreme Court in City of 
Chicago v. Morales.72 
The civil liberties problems with the anti-gang public nuisance 
injunctions are obvious. Without waiting to be asked, and, indeed, 
without ever meeting any of the Playboy Gangster Crips, the ACLU 
intervened on their behalf. The ACLU sought to limit the reach of 
the injunction to individuals specifically named as defendants and 
shown to have been served, sought to limit the activities prohibited 
under the injunction to activity that was already unlawful, and argued 
that any defendant in the proceedings on the granting of injunctive 
relief had a right to counsel, including the appointment of counsel 
upon a showing of indigency.73 The trial court agreed with each of the 
66. Id. ("m. Do not use or possess or provide to any other person any narcotic or 
controlled substance or related paraphernalia or poison."). 
67. Id. at 3-4 ("j. Do not possess on your person or in a vehicle upon any public 
street, avenue, alley, park or other public place or in any place open to public view or in 
any public hallway or public passageway any remote communication device including, but 
not limited to, any walkie-talkie, paging device, or portable, remote or car telephone."). 
68. Id. at 3 ("f. Do not approach the driver or passenger of any vehicle."). 
69. Id. at 5 ("u. Do not have more than one (1) visitor at your residence within a 
twenty-four (24) hour period who remains less than ten (10) minutes, except public 
employees, utility service personnel or delivery persons from lawful businesses."). 
70. Commentary on People v. Playboy Gangster Crips includes Boga, supra note 5, at 
478-79; Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA 
L. REv. 739, 744 & n. 19; Debra R. Schultz, Comment, "The Right to be Let Alone": 
Fourth Amendment Rights and Gang Violence, 16 W. ST. U. L. REv. 725, 733-34 (1989); 
Stewart, supra note 51, at 2264; Woo, supra note 3, at 217-219; Mark Thompson, A 
Gangland Nuisance, CAL. LAW. (Jan-Feb. 1988) at 21. 
71. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, (Mar. 1982) at 29 (advancing highly influential claim that eliminating relatively 
minor signs of neighborhood disorder deters more serious crime); see, e.g., Kurki, supra 
note 10, at 238 (describing influence of Wilson and Kelling's "broken windows" theory). 
72. 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
73. See People v.Playboy Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (L.A. County Super. Ct.). 
Subsequently an appellate court has ruled that appointment of counsel is not required in 
these injunction proceedings. See Iraheta v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 70 
Cal. App. 4th 1500 (1999). In Iraheta prosecutors filed a civil lawsuit seeking an injunction 
to abate a public nuisance naming the 18th Street Gang, 92 individuals, and 200 "Doe" 
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ACLU arguments, and issued an injunction limited in those ways. In 
these circumstances, both the ACLU and the City Attorney's office 
claimed victory, and the anti-gang public nuisance injunction was 
virtually dead for the next five years.74 
In 1992, a spate of California cities attempted to revive and 
expand the anti-gang public nuisance injunction, and found greater 
judicial receptiveness.75 Probably the most expansive was the twenty-
two point preliminary injunction issued in People v. Blythe Street 
Gang, which named a 350-person gang as defendant and covered an 
lBO-block area.76 The most important of these injunctions, however, 
was sought by prosecutors in San Jose and eventually upheld by the 
California Supreme Court in People ex reI. Gallo v. Acuna.77 
From Playboy Gangster Crips to Acuna, the pattern for these 
cases was the same: prosecutors prepared a case for a preliminary 
injunction based on scores of declarations from police officers and 
residents who reported the criminal activity of gang members 
terrorizing the people of the neighborhood. In Acuna, the California 
Supreme Court relied on forty-eight declarations to find that San 
defendants (id. at 1502), and alleging that the defendants "waged a gang war, including 
engaging in drug dealing, shootings, robberies, drinking and urinating in public, 
threatening residents, vandalizing and defacing with graffiti public and private property, 
trespassing on property, and other injurious activities against the residents." Id. at 1502-
03. The court found no right to counsel, holding that "the purpose of these proceedings is 
not to punish petitioners. Rather, the purpose of these proceedings is to protect the rights 
of people residing and working in the target areas .... " Id. at 1512. 
74. See Paul Feldman, Judge OK's Modified Measures to Curb Gang, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 1987, Pt. 2, at 3; Paul Feldman, Judge Raps City Atty.'s Bid to Neutralize Gangs, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1987, Pt. 2, at 3; Paul Feldman, City Attorney Modifies Plan to 
Control Street Gangs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1987, Pt. 2, at 3; see also Woo, supra note 3, at 
219 (noting the five year gap before next anti-gang injunction, but assessing it as a surprise 
in light of the "success" of the Playboy Gangster Crips injunction). In spite of the very 
limited nature of the uncontested injunction, the City claimed that the injunction changed 
the neighborhood dramatically. See, e.g., Westside Gang Crime Off, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 
1988, at 2, 3 (home ed.) (reporting 30% reduction in gang-related crime after Playboy 
Gangster Crips injunction). The effectiveness of these injunctions as crime reduction tools 
is in dispute, however. Many prosecutors claim that each has been a tremendous success, 
but some evidence suggests otherwise. See ACLU FOUNDATION OF SO. CAL., FALSE 
PREMISE, FALSE PROMISE: THE BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS 
AFTERMATH (1997) (providing data supporting claim that the Panorama City anti-gang 
injunction simply moved the criminal activity, without reducing it). 
75. For fuller descriptions of the anti-gang injunctions, see Boga, supra note 5, at text 
accompanying notes 1-31; Stewart, supra note 51, at 2264-68; Werdegar, supra note 5, at 
415-418; Woo, supra note 3, at 219-221. 
76. N. LC 020525 (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Apr. 27, 1993) (modified 
order for preliminary injunctions), described in Werdegar, supra note 5, at 415 & n. 34. 
77. 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1100 (1997). 
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Jose's Rocksprings neighborhood was "an urban war zone.,,78 The 
Acuna trial court had issued a twenty-four paragraph injunction 
against thirty-eight defendants,79 prohibiting a wide range of activity 
within the four-block Rocksprings neighborhood -- including fighting, 
trespassing, public urinating, littering, and public possession of 
hammers, nails, screw drivers, pagers or beepers.so Upon 
interlocutory appeal, the court of appeal, invalidated fifteen of the 
twenty-four provisions as being unconstitutionally vague or 
overbroad, leaving only provisions that enjoined conduct defined as 
crimes under the California Penal Code,8! essentially repeating the 
guarded and critical Playboy Gangster Crips judicial response. The 
City sought California Supreme Court review of only two of the 
contested provisions, the one that prevented any of the named 
defendants from being in public with any other defendant or member 
of the targeted gang,82 and the one that enjoined defendants from 
"confronting, intimidating, annoying, hara~sing, threatening, 
challenging, provoking, assaulting andlor battering any residents or 
patrons, or visitors to [the neighborhood] known to have complained 
about gang activities.,,83 The California Supreme Court's enthusiasm 
for the public nuisance injunction suggests that the City could have 
been much more ambitious in the provisions it took to the Court. 
The majority endorsed the injunction, rejecting First Amendment 
arguments based on freedom of association,84 overbreadth,85 and 
vagueness86 claims. 
Notwithstanding the Acuna majority opinion, and the spread to 
other states of anti-gang public nuisance injunctions,87 the individual 
78. Id. at 1101. 
79. Id. 
80. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1135 n. 3 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
81. Id. at 1101. 
82 Id. Paragraph (a) enjoined defendants from "Standing, sitting, walking, driving, 
gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with any other defendant ... or with any 
other known 'VST' (Varrio Sureno Town or Varrio Sureno Treces) or 'VSL' (Varrio 
Sureno Locos) member." Id. 
83. Id. at 1118. 
84. Id. at 1111. 
85. Id. at 1114. 
86. Id. at 1118-19. 
87. See Chris Fiscus, Phoenix Aims to Break Gangs' Grip: Calif. Shows Way to Bar 
Menacing Street Gatherings, ARIZ. REpUBLIC, May 23, 1998, at Al; John W. Gonzalez, 
Judge Limits Suspects with 'Gang Injunction,' HOUSTON CHRON. ,Aug. 1, 1998, at 1. The 
Los Angeles City Attorney's office claims to have received inquiries about the anti-gang 
injunctions from prosecuting agencies in Illinois, Texas, Arkansas, Florida, and Arizona. 
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rights flaws in the concept are obvious. The central principle of being 
held responsible for one's own acts, the centerpiece of our 
constitutional system of criminal procedure, is noticeably absent.88 
The injunction is justified on the basis of many serious crimes 
allegedly committed by members of the gangs; those serious crimes 
are used to inhibit the freedom of all the alleged members of the 
gang, without any evidence tying the individual controlled by the 
injunction to the specific criminal activity justifying the injunction. In 
Acuna, for example, the court found that "murder, attempted 
murder, drive-by shootings, assault and battery, vandalism, arson and 
theft are commonplace,,,89 but the injunction reaches people who are 
suspected gang members, whether or not they have any record of 
arrest or conviction, 90 and whether they are suspected of committing 
the acts that constitute a public nuisance. As noted by the dissenting 
justices, the injunctions rest on extremely expansive notions of guilt 
by association.91 A person can be identified as a gang member simply 
by having been observed twice in the presence of other identified 
gang members; Justice Mosk noted that Los Angeles law enforcement 
officials have identified 47 percent of the African American men 
between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-four as suspected gang 
members, using similar criteria.92 
The injunctions also take advantage of the lower burden of proof 
in a civil action and the lack of criminal procedural protections for the 
defendant. A civil defendant has no right to appointed counsel, and 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. By its terms, the 
injunction implicates fundamental rights of association and 
expression, and suggests vagueness and overbreadth problems as 
well.93 
But restorative justice, not those glaring individual liberties 
issues, is my concern here. The anti-gang injunctions offer surface 
consistency with the principles of restorative justice, but 
McClellan, supra note 5, at 359. 
88. See Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1145-47 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
89. 14 Cal. 4th at 1100. 
90. See 14 Cal. 4th at 1146 n. 11 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
91. See id. at 1129-32 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 1142-47 (Mosk, J., 
dissenting). 
92. See id. at 1133 n.1 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
93. See also In re Englebrecht, 67 Cal. App. 4th 486 (1998) (upholding association 
limitations of anti-gang injunction on basis of Acuna but striking down as overbroad 
provision that prohibited gang members from using pagers or beepers within two-square 
mile area). 
734 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:717 
fundamentally operate in a way that undermines the values and 
promise of restorative justice. That betrayal may be even more 
damning than the substantial civil liberties defects in the public 
nuisance injunctions. 
ID. Restorative Justice Critique of Anti-gang Injunctions 
The anti-gang injunctions appear similar to restorative justice 
programs in the explicit involvement of the community, the active 
role of the victims, the understanding of a crime as an injury, and the 
underlying willingness to circumvent established criminal justice 
process. 
A. Presence of the community 
A restorative justice perspective assumes that crime causes injury 
to the community. Restorative justice programs rely on collective, 
community responsibility for responses to lawbreaking in part to 
repair the breach to the community that perhaps preceded and 
certainly was worsened by the crime. The "community" is as present 
in the Acuna Court's justification for the arguable civil liberties 
infringements of the anti-gang injunctions as it is in the aspirations of 
restorative justice. In Acuna, the California Supreme Court 
reminded us, "[i]t is precisely this recognition of-and willingness to 
vindicate-the value of community and the collective interests it 
furthers rather than to punish criminal acts that lies at the heart of the 
public nuisance as an equitable doctrine.,,94 The court recognized the 
collective participation in the public nuisance injunction: "[t]he public 
nuisance doctrine is aimed at the protection and redress of 
community interests and, at least in theory, embodies a kind of 
collective ideal of civil life which the courts have vindicated by 
equitable remedies since the beginning of the 16th century.,,95 
Successfully giving voice to community concerns would be a 
significant strength of an anti-gang injunction. The complaint in 
Acuna attached forty-eight declarations about the criminal activity in 
the Rocksprings neighborhood of San Jose.% The Acuna court 
affirmed that "the interests of the community are not invariably less 
94. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1109. 
95. Id. at 1103; see also Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming 
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1160-61 (1998) (referring to anti-gang 
injunctions as examples of "community policing"). 
96. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1100. 
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important than the freedom of individuals.,,97 At this level of 
generality, such sentiments are hard to dispute.98 The Acuna court, 
however, promoted a notion of community safety and individual 
liberties as directly in conflict, as warring combatants in a winner-
take-all contest.99 The Acuna court found the freedom of alleged 
gang members to be directly contrary to the freedom of innocent 
members of the community, observing: "[t]o hold that the liberty of 
the peaceful, industrious residents of Rocksprings must be forfeited 
to preserve the illusion of freedom for those whose ill conduct is 
deleterious to the community as a whole is to ignore half the political 
promise of the Constitutional and the whole of its sense."lOO This view 
of the community and gang members as easily separated and in 
complete opposition is a dangerously over-simplified understanding 
of gang presence; it is inconsistent with the reality of most gang 
members, who have multiple family and institutional ties to the 
communities of their own and nearby neighborhoods. The complex 
relationships of gang members within their communities is one reason 
that law enforcement against gang crimes is so difficult. 
The Acuna court upheld an injunction that had the purpose of 
banishing the gang members from the streets of the neighborhood, 
literally removing them from the community.lOl Indeed, the only 
clearly delineated aspect of the community invoked in Acuna is that it 
does not include the gang members. The injunction made real in 
physical, spacial terms the separation of the gang members from the 
community. The Acuna court's simplistic and adamant separation of 
suspected gang members from the community is especially troubling 
given the racial and class basis of the identity of the group being cast 
97. Id. at 1102. 
98. Indeed, similar statements are used to justify restorative justice programs in the 
face of civil liberties objections. 
99. But see, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATION, CRIME, AND FREEDOM 63 
(2000). Braithwaite challenges this offset: "The republican does not struggle politically for 
a world in which shaming is used in a way that trades a reduction in freedom for a 
reduction in crime. Such a trade-off manifests a liberal way of thinking about crime. The 
republican struggles for a world where shame is used both to increase freedom and to 
reduce crime. The widespread liberal belief that a high crime rate is a price we pay for 
free society, that freedom and crime are locked into some hydraulic relationship, is 
wrong." Id. 
100. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1125. 
101. See Boga, supra note 5, at text accompanying notes 60-61 ("The removal of gang 
members from their own neighborhood streets represents a literal example of this 
metaphorical sanitization of the public realm."). 
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out, suspected gang members.102 
Restorative justice principles, by contrast, build the relationship 
between the community and the offender, rather than casting the 
offender aside. The community is present by the involvement of 
people close to the victim, and of people close to the offender. This is 
a much more complex notion of community, for several reasons. 
First, in direct contrast to the exclusionary vision of community in 
Acuna, restorative justice principles recognize the offender's place 
within a community, and attempt to restore that place.103 Next, the 
restorative justice conferences create new, concrete, albeit temporary 
communities, by bringing together interested people to address the 
problems caused by the wrong-doing. Finally, the restorative process 
can create relationships between the offender and the victim, and 
between their respective supporters, and in that way build new, more 
lasting communities. The creation of these purposeful communities 
might be especially important in the context of broken or enfeebled 
communities, such as those plagued by rampant gang violence. 1001 
B. Victim Control 
In the restorative justice model, the victim of crime and members 
of the community are actively engaged in the process of restoring 
justice. Even within their limited constructions of community, the 
anti-gang injunctions promise to deliver greater victim control than 
criminal processes can. The use of a civil action based on declarations 
of specific injuries from many community members is quite a 
different foundation and justification for action than the typical 
criminal complaint. Recognizing the crime as an injury and giving 
voice to the victim might be the rhetoric and formality of the public 
nuisance injunction, but the reality is quite different. Although voices 
of the victims and the community are used to justify the injunction, 
102 See Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1130 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[The] court 
cannot enjoin all Mexican-Americans because some Mexican-Americans contribute to the 
public nuisance in Rocksprings."); id. at 1132 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("Montesquieu, 
Locke, and Madison will turn over in their graves when they learn they are cited in an 
opinion that does not enhance liberty but deprives a number of simple rights to a group of 
Latino youths who have not been convicted of a crime."). 
103. E.g., BRAITHWAITE, REGULATION, supra note 99, at 287 ("The separation of the 
denounced person must be terminated by rituals of inclusion that place him, even 
physically, inside rather than outside"). 
104. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, REGULATION, supra note 99, at 332 ("In the alienated 
urban context where community is not spontaneously emergent in a satisfactory way, a 
criminal justice system aimed at restoration can construct a community of care around a 
specific offender or a specific victim who is in trouble .... "). 
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they are not in any sense controlling the action. For example, of the 
scores of declarations supporting the injunction in Acuna, the only 
ones that linked the crime alleged to the targeted gangs were two 
declarations from police officers.lOs The anti-gang public nuisance 
injunctions are formally civil, but effectively criminal proceedings; 
prosecutors, and not victims, initiate and ultimately control the case. 
The injunction can give the prosecutor the ability to pursue rough 
justice,l06 but those remedial choices are not in the hands of the 
victims, or the community. 
C. Crime as Injury 
Restorative justice responds to the crime as an injury to be 
healed. The anti-gang public nuisance injunctions treat crimes as 
injuries to be remedied; the nuisance to the community is the injury 
created by the gang members' lawbreaking. Anti-gang injunctions 
are thus formally based on recognizing the injury--the public 
nuisance--caused by the criminal activity. But the anti-gang 
injunctions operate by converting that injury to the community into 
another crime, namely the violation of the injunction. The remedy 
for the public nuisance is that individual gang" members can be 
arrested for violating the terms of the injunction, subjecting them to 
misdemeanor criminal contempt.I07 
The original serious criminal offenses (murder, robbery, and so 
on) are converted into an injury (public nuisance), which is used to 
justify restrictions on activity that, when violated, create new, lesser 
level crimes. The result is that the gang members suspected of 
participating in murders, robberies, and other serious crimes are 
arrested for being in the presence of other gang members, having 
beepers, and other non-criminal activity. 
These new, low-level violations are understood and treated as 
crimes, not injuries. In fact, any injuries inherent in the violations are 
105. Acuna, 14 Ca1.4th at 1131 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting). But see Debra 
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, 
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 669-70 (1997) (in analysis 
supporting relaxation of vagueness requirements generally, praising injunctions as 
consistent with new policing in their requirement of police interaction with community 
members to obtain affidavits). 
106. See McClellan, supra note 5, at 355 (describing Los Angeles assistant city attorney 
who seeks "creative" punishments, such as community service, completion of drug or 
alcohol rehabilitation, or requiring the achievement of a general equivalency diploma, for 
injunction defendants who have not previously been incarcerated). 
107. See CAL. PEN. CODE, § 166 (Deering 20(0). 
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often so attenuated as to be virtually non-existent. What is the injury 
from having two gang members together in a car, or walking down 
the street? Who is the victim? Who is the victim from the defendant's 
possession of a beeper? The anti-gang public nuisance injunction 
creates more violations without addressing the original, serious 
crimes. The police presence is extended, and the government has 
further mechanisms of control, at least in theory. But the criminal 
problem has been treated as an injury in only the most formal and 
temporary sense. The fundamental restorative project of repairing 
injuries has been easily lost. 
D. Holding the Offender Accountable 
The central theme of restorative justice is healing injury by 
holding the offender accountable to make amends for the injuries he 
or she has caused. In theory, the anti-gang public nuisance 
injunctions hold gang members responsible for the injuries caused to 
the community by the gang's activities. The Acuna court justified the 
breadth of the injunction by noting, "Freedom and responsibility are 
joined at the hip."l08 
But the rhetoric of accountability masks the opposite in the anti-
gang injunctions. From a restorative justice perspective, the problem 
with the anti-gang injunction is not that gang members are being held 
responsible for being members of a gang identified with destructive 
behaviors. Gang members should be held accountable for those 
choices and actions. The accountability problem with the anti-gang 
injunction is much deeper; the gang members are not really held 
responsible for anything significant. The litany of murders, robberies, 
and assaults combining to place the neighborhood under siege is used 
to justify dramatic steps to limit the freedom of the gang members. 
But the only accountability built into the injunction is making 
suspected gang members responsible for trivial (at least as compared 
to the justificatory crimes) violations. 
The anti-gang public nuisance injunctions are promoted as an 
aggressive new weapon in the war against gangs, but fundamentally 
they are an admission of defeat.l09 From a restorative justice 
perspective, a crucial weakness in this scheme is that the entire 
process never holds anyone accountable for the serious crimes that in 
fact are causing injuries. The gang member who has (at least in 
108. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1102. 
109. This is the anti-gang equivalent of convicting AI Capone on income tax evasion, 
except that income tax evasion was a preexisting, serious crime. 
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theory) participated in murder is arrested for being present with other 
gang members. No one is held accountable for the earlier, provoking 
crimes. no Gang members who are indeed responsible for serious 
crimes are not held accountable for them. Suspected gang members 
who are not responsible for serious crimes are blamed equally for 
them, and arrested for behavior that can be entirely innocent. In 
either case, the goals of true accountability or individual 
responsibility are sacrificed to temporary incapacitation or disruption 
through removal into the incarceration system. 
The injunction is a symbolic message of removal from the 
community. As a method of accountability, it is ineffective because 
the sanctions are more like harassment. The provisions of the 
injunction upheld in Acuna prohibited suspected g'ang members from 
hanging out with their friendslll or "annoying" people in the 
neighborhood known to have complained about them.ll2 Declaring 
certain people out of the community, and then removing them for a 
short time for violating an injunction, combines the harshness of 
punitive expulsion from the community with virtually no 
accountability. 
The relatively trivial nature of the basis for the arrest is not likely 
to imbue the alleged gang member, whether a serious offender or 
relatively innocent peripheral member, with acknowledgement of any 
injury caused.ll3 In contrast, by being held personally responsible for 
redressing the injuries he or she has caused, an offender in a 
restorative justice process is less likely to "displace remorse for the 
110. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 21, at 12 (asking, as part of the project of 
"rethinking the business of juvenile justice": "If the goal of sanctioning is to send messages 
to offenders about the consequences and harm caused to others by crime, why are 
sanctions so unrelated to the offense itself and why is the sanctioning and rehabilitative 
process so detached from victims and the offender's community?" (drawing on Bazemore 
and Washington, Charting the Future of the Juvenile Justice System: Reinventing Mission 
and Management, 68 SPECTRUM, THE JOURNAL OF STATE GOVERNMENT 51 (1995»). 
111. See Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1110 (par. (a) of injunction prohibited "Standing, sitting, 
walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with any other 
defendant ... or with any other known VST or VSL member."). 
112 [d. at 1118 (par. (k) of injunction enjoined defendants from "confronting, 
intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or 
battering any residents or patrons or visitors to Rocksprings... known to have 
complained about gang activities."). 
113. Gary Stewart makes this point about the anti-gang injunctions by quoting 
Malcolm W. Klein, Street Gangs and the Juvenile Justice System in the 1990s, 23 PEPP. L. 
REV. 860, 863 (1996), asking, "[d]oes he say, 'Oh my goodness gracious. I have been 
deterred,' or does he say, if you will pardon the language, 'Motherfuckers couldn't hold 
the homey.' Of course, he says the latter." Stewart, supra note 51, at 2278. 
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action into resentment of the punishment.,,114 In addition, the goal of 
healing the injury to the community goes largely unmet if the original 
offense is unaddressed. 
E. Circumvention of Criminal Justice Protections 
Critics of restorative justice are appropriately wary about the 
potential loss of criminal procedural protections, but Acuna reveals 
that fundamental procedural protections are already drastically 
diminished, at least for some. In Acuna the majority of the California 
Supreme Court willingly jettisoned fundamental individual rights in 
the furtherance of arguably minimal benefits to the community. Such 
an emphatic and untroubled balancing suggests that the Acuna 
majority placed remarkably little value on the freedoms at stake.ll5 
The stunningly light weight given to the civil liberties issues is surely 
related to the particular context of Acuna and other anti-gang public 
nuisance injunctions, young men and some women of color suspected 
of gang membership. Acuna might suggest that the racialized and 
class-based divisions of our society are so imbedded in the individual 
rights-based, adversarial criminal justice system that the "individual" 
being protected is too easily understood to be both "other" and 
undifferentiated, and thus not truly worthy of constitutional 
protection. Individual rights are easily stripped from suspects 
perceived mainly on the basis of a frightening group identity.116 In 
Acuna, the community got little in return. Most restorative justice 
programs also replace or circumvent ordinary criminal justice 
procedures. The question is, what replaces those protections, and 
what is gained? 
IV. Restorative Justice for Rocksprings 
What would restorative justice for Rocksprings look like? The 
114. Hudson, supra note 26, at 24l. 
115. See also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the anti-loitering ordinance should have been upheld, since the "minor 
limitation upon the free state of nature that this prophylactic arrangement imposed upon 
all Chicagoans seemed to them (and it seems to me) a small price to pay for liberation of 
their streets"). But see Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal 
Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1219 (2000) (finding that the empirical data does not suggest poor urban blacks are 
prepared to waive constitutional rights in order to reduce crime). 
116. See, e.g., Howarth, supra note 42 (discussing, for example, the incompatibility of 
imposed identity of Black gang member and innocence); Roberts, supra note 51, at 801 
(criticizing a racialized dichotomy in judicial decisions separating categories of the law 
abiding and lawless). 
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picture of Rocksprings painted in Acuna is a neighborhood under 
siege from gang members engaged in violent, lawless, battles with 
other gangs and with the police. The gang members arguably control 
the neighborhood more than do the police. The anti-gang injunction 
strategy attempts to eviscerate the gang control by holding all gang 
members responsible for all injuries caused by the gang. Easily 
identifiable activity, such as possession of beepers or association with 
other gang members, becomes the basis for an arrest. The reach of 
the police is thereby extended to peripheral gang members, and to 
less serious activity. The hardcore gangsters and the peripheral 
hangers-on are all controlled by the limiting injunction. 
What does the gentle theorizing of restorative justice have to say 
about restoring peace to an "urban war zone,,1l7 like Rocksprings? 
Restorative justice would use a variety of mechanisms to empower 
community engagement with the identification, prevention, and 
response to criminal injuries. As to crimes that have been committed, 
the goal of accountability assumes, as a threshold matter, that even 
the most limited restorative justice process would be based on 
identification of the specific individuals responsible for any particular 
injury. Although claims are made that restorative justice can be useful 
for identifying crime and assigning guilt,US more modest claims limit 
restorative justice mechanisms to offenders who have been found 
guilty or who are willing to admit responsibility.u9 Assuming that the 
identified offender and victim choosel20 to participate in a restorative 
justice process, under the a conferencing model, the victim and 
perpetrator would each bring a group of people most able to support 
them for a face-to-face meeting. 
For any of the Rocksprings injuries, the two groups would come 
from different neighborhoods, as the gang members were identified 
as coming from outside Rocksprings.l21 The group could include, for 
117. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1100. 
118. See Braithwaite, supra note 12, at 15-16 (suggesting potential benefit of 
restorative justice processes for factfinding even without clear admissions of guilt). 
119. Under current systems, the vast majority of offenders plead guilty in exchange for 
some benefit, usually a lesser sentence. See Nancy Jean King, The American Jury, 62 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROB. 41, 141 (1999). King uses figures showing that only 3-10% of felony 
cases go to trial, and of those, more than one/third are adjudicated by a judge without a 
jury. Id. See also George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000). 
Many restorative justice programs offer the possibility of alternatives to incarceration as 
an incentive to acknowledge guilt. 
120. Many issues of coercion are inherent here, of course. See Brown, supra note 7, at 
1265-72; Delgado, supra note 36, at 760-61. 
121. The gang members targeted by most of the public nuisance injunctions live in the 
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example, the victim with a spouse and a friend and the offender with 
a parent and a teacher, or an uncle and a neighbor.122 The victim 
would have an opportunity to tell the perpetrator the impact of the 
lawbreaking and ask him or her to make amends. The perpetrator, in 
front of a community of people who cared about him or her, would be 
asked to take responsibility for the injuries inflicted and for making 
amends.l23 The exact process by which the perpetrator would make 
amends would be negotiated by those present. 
We might conclude that such a meeting, in isolation, in a 
community with such terror and lawlessness, would offer no security 
to the victim. Surely that is true.124 Any effective restorative justice 
program in this context would have to include opportunities for 
community members to work together to reduce the grip of the gang-
related drug trafficking and resultant violence. Social and political 
movements-separate from the state-would have to be built to 
create social disapprobation, or shame in Braithwaite's terms, for 
harmful gang activity.125 A community movement bringing restorative 
justice principles to preventive programs would provide context and 
visibility beyond the individual meetings or conferences occasioned 
by discrete incidents of law-breaking.126 
Although the context is very different, similar goals animated a 
set of self-regulatory programs in Australia by local citizens and pub 
and club owners designed to reduce violence associated with the pubs 
and clubs.127 As described by John Braithwaite, the bartenders were 
neighborhoods to which the injunctions apply. 
122. For a detailed description of such a conference, see BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, 
at 317-19. 
123. The conferencing model potentially avoids many of the important limitations of 
one-on-one victim-offender mediation, such as those delineated in Delgado, supra note 36, 
at 759-7l. 
124. Without the context of a coherent vision and implementation of restorative 
justice, the benefits of isolated or peripheral restorative justice programs will be limited. 
See Charles Tracy, Associate Editor's Editorial: The Promises and Perils of Restorative 
Justice, 42 INT'L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 275 
(1998) (sermonizing against cooptation of restorative justice goals into dominant values 
through subsidiary projects in danger of being overwhelmed by adversarial context). 
125. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 75 ("the republican pursues the objective of 
reducing crime with more of an eye to community organization than to criminal 
enforcement"). 
126. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 57-94 (discussing need to support social 
movements with egalitarian criminal justice agendas). 
127. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 1737 (citing Ross Homel et ai, Preventing A/coho/-
Related Crime Through Community Action: The Surfers Paradise Safety Action Project, in 
7 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 35 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1997)). 
Summer 2000] TOWARD RESTORATIVE CONSTITUTION 743 
taught peaceable techniques for defusing violence, responsible 
serving practices to reduce drunkenness, and other measures.!28 
During the project, assaults were reduced to less than half of previous 
levels, but returned to normal when the project's funding ended and 
ordinary policing techniques returned.!29 The community engagement 
- including civilian responsibility for prevention and non-adversarial 
violence reduction interventions - proved quite effective for general 
deterrence and incapacitation goals. 
Although Rocksprings' gang violence is certainly a different 
problem than bar brawls, the concept of widespread community 
peacekeeping training and interventions could be transferred to 
communities being overtaken by gang violence. In its very persistence 
and growth, gang crime reminds us of the human search for belonging 
and community. The gang is itself a community, albeit often a 
frightening, lawbreaking, violent, community. More importantly, 
gang violence is perhaps the most disturbing and frightening in our 
society today.!30 Applying restorative justice principles to entrenched 
gang violence is using a hard case to put forth a bold version of 
restorative justice. Even if restorative justice conferences are not 
suitable for homicides, the majority of identified gang members are 
responsible for relatively less serious criminal activity. Using 
restorative justice to address injuries caused by gang members could 
help restorative justice to redirect criminal and juvenile justice policy, 
not just become the less punitive alternative for the most privileged, 
least frightening, offenders.!3! 
Even if we can begin to imagine a restorative justice approach to 
gang violence in Rocksprings, can we imagine such an approach 
within constitutional principles? 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Criminologist Jerome Miller points out that "[P]oliticians and human-service 
professionals alike periodically call the public's attention to this ostensibly more unfeeling, 
cold, and dangerous young offender who now stalks our streets." JEROME MILLER, 
SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 37-38 (1996); see also Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, supra note 
42, at 112 (discussing widespread image of gang members as 'new breed' of amoral 
animal). 
131. See Brown, supra note 7, at 1282-85; Delgado, supra note 36, at 767-68; Tracy, 
supra note 124 (arguing for transformative restorative justice, not peripheral alternative 
programs). 
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v. A Restorative Constitution 
What would a Restorative Constitution look like? Is it possible 
for our Constitution to offer the protection of restoration? As John 
Braithwaite counsels, "If we take restorative justice seriously, it ... 
means transformed foundations of criminal jurisprudence and of our 
notions of freedom, democracy, and community.,,132 Does our 
Constitution permit this transformation? Restorative justice 
principles are assumed by most United States observers to raise 
substantial and perhaps insurmountable constitutional concerns.133 
Any such accommodation requires breaking down the severely 
individualistic, oppositional mode of constitutional criminal 
procedural protection. The constitutionalized adversary system 
would have to become the constitutionalized restorative system. A 
Restorative Constitution would mean fundamental restructuring of 
constitutional frameworks for the roles of the offender, the victim, 
and the community consistent with restorative justice principles. 
A. The Accused: Restorative Liberty of Accountability 
The looming problem with a Restorative Constitution is the 
potential loss of constitutional protections for the accused. Those 
constitutional protections operate within the adversary system, 
protecting the accused from the most powerful adversary, the state. 
The constitutional protections fall within two main categories, the 
right to equal treatment, and the right to liberty-based procedural 
fairness. Restorative justice implicates both. 
1. Equality 
The state today is supposed to provide some protection against 
private bias.l34 Any system of justice that allows individual victims to 
control the response to their injuries invites enormous differences in 
punishment for apparently identical criminal behavior. The 
inconsistency of individualized justice raises Eighth Amendment 
proportionality!35 and Fourteenth Amendment equal protectionl36 
132. Braithwaite, supra note 12, at 2. 
133. E.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 1288-92; Delgado, supra note 36, especially at 760. 
134. E.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 1288; Delgado, supra note 36, at 759-60. 
135. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that the Eighth Amendment forbids extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" 
to the crime). 
136. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that extending prison 
sentence of convicted criminal unable to pay fine violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
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concerns. We can also easily understand that restorative justice could 
yield to or even expand ever-present racial, class, or other types of 
biases.137 Under a regimen of restorative justice conferences, for 
example, different offenders who have committed acts that would be 
classified as the same crime can receive very different responses and 
demands from the victims. Given that racial and class-based 
inequality in the criminal justice system is one motivation for a turn 
toward restorative justice, questions about the potential inequalities 
of restorative justice require a strong answer. 
One answer is that robust equality should take account of 
differences in the circumstances of criminal offenses.l38 The impact of 
criminal behavior-the injury caused-can be vastly different even for 
acts constituting the same criminal offense. Equality based on 
identical punishment for identical offenses rests on the fiction that 
any aggravated assault reflects the same culpability or causes identical 
harm, or that every three-year prison sentence imposes identical 
hardship.139 Certainly, too, even the most rigid systems of determinate 
sentencing, for example, are easily understood to embody class- and 
race-based biases of the legislators or prosecutors; the gross 
disparities in sentences between crack and powder cocaine famously 
exemply blatant inequality embedded in apparently neutral rules.140 
Ultimately, though, the only way to ensure that the informal 
community mechanisms of restorative justice do not re-create or even 
magnify private biases is to provide oversight of their results. 
Records must be maintained, and individual agreed-upon atonement 
activities would need to be rejected if they are unusually onerous. In 
setting up restorative justice processes, the state has an obligation to 
137. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 36, at 767-68. Victims privileged by class or race, for 
example, could impose elevated demands, especially on offenders without those privileged 
identities. 
138. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 13-16 (1996). 
139. Martin Wright makes this point, but in a way that arguably reflects class- or race-
bias, an easy failing when attempting to compare and contrast the relative hardship to 
differently situated offenders of identical sentences. See MARTIN WRIGHf, RESTORING 
RESPECT FOR JUSTICE: A SYMPOSIUM 147 (1999); see also Delgado, supra note 36 
(warning about such bias). 
140. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of 
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM. L. REv. 13 (1998); Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: 'De-
Coding' Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. 
RACE & LAW 611 (2000); see generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 60 ("[E]ven 
though the policy of just deserts is based on equal punishment for equal wrongs and 
republicanism is not, it is repUblicanism that in practice can deliver more egalitarian 
punishment practices. Because just deserts tend to be successfully imposed on the poor 
and unsuccessfully on the rich ... "). 
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enforce protections against gross disproportionality or ratification of 
personal prejudice.141 In the same way that ordinary retributive 
criminal sanctions provide a backdrop for motivating an offender to 
engage in restorative justice programs/42 ordinary governmental 
guarantees of equal protection should be fully applicable to vitiate 
any restorative justice proceeding infected by gross disproportionalit~1 
oridentified bias.143 
2. Liberty 
The Constitution invites and at least partially enables the 
accused to take on the role of adversary against the state, but it needs 
fundamental reorientation to require or even support the role of 
making amends. In its emphasis on an offender making amends to his 
or her victim, restorative justice assumes that the offender is guilty. 
Thus, restorative justice programs generally should not be used when 
guilt is at issue. Most criminal defendants, however, plead guilty to 
something.144 
Consider the person who is in fact guilty of the charges against 
him or her. What does the Constitution offer that person? The 
accused's constitutional rights are the rights to resist the efforts of the 
141. For a description of research needed to investigate bias in restorative justice 
programs, see Mara F. Schiff, Restorative Justice Interventions for Juvenile Offenders: A 
Research Agenda for the Next Decade, 1 WEST. CRIMINOL. REv. 1,11 (1998) [online at 
<http://wcr.sonoma.edulv1nllv1n1.html>(visited Nov. 23, 20(0)]; see also Delgado, supra 
note 36, at 774 (urging critical oversight of restorative justice projects to reduce bias); see 
generally Luke McNamara, Appellate Court Scrutiny of Circle Sentencing, 27 MANITOBA 
L. J. 209 (2000) (describing Canadian appellate review of restorative justice circles). 
142. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 81 ("[I]t would not serve the objective 
of parsimonious punishment to abolish imprisonment altogether as a sentence for assault. 
... [A] consequence of throwing away the big stick is that middle-sized sticks would be 
used more often."); ide ("[C]redible criminal enforcement capability strengthens the hand 
of communitarian crime control; it does not supplant it."). 
143. Braithwaite acknowledges, "[w]hile it is a myth that centralized state law enabled 
greater consistency and lesser partiality than community-based restorative justice, it is true 
that abuse of power always was and still is common in community justice.... [S]tate 
oversight of restorative justice in the community can be a check on abuse of rights in local 
programs .... " Id. at 334. 
144. The vast majority of criminal cases are plea-bargained, through formal or 
informal negotiations within the constraints of the legal system. See Fisher, supra note 
199; King, supra note 119, at 141. In other words, to protect themselves, criminal 
defendants admit wrong-doing, waiving many of their constitutional rights. The 
constitutional rights become, thereby, bargaining chips, in an individual's fight against the 
state (the community). This suggests that the vast majority of criminal cases could be 
appropriate for restorative justice, even if limited to cases in which criminal defendants 
admit guilt. 
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state to deprive him or her of liberty.145 The constitutional procedural 
protections in a very real sense offer the accused the opportunity to 
try to avoid responsibility. 
Under our current procedures, the accused is defensive and 
isolated. From the moment of being charged by "the People," the 
accused is granted defensive rights in an adversarial relationship 
against the community. Our current criminal and juvenile justice 
systems allow great integrity, resistance, and isolation. The right to 
remain silent,l46 the due process right to be acquitted unless found 
gUilty beyond a reasonable doubt,147 and the panoply of constitutional 
criminal protections are extreme manifestations of the right to be left 
alone. The accused's liberty is understood as the negative freedom 
not to be controlled by the state. 
The Constitution is defensive, creating a protective shield around 
an individual. In that sense, the autonomy values of the individual are 
well-protected. The accused criminal is solitary, responsible only to 
himself or herself. Even Gary Gilmore's mother had no standing to 
challenge Utah's execution of him, to which he submitted voluntarily, 
because she was a stranger to the proceedings.l48 The criminal 
defendant is the hyper-rugged individualist, although, ironically, the 
flesh and blood person is easily obscured behind the rampant 
individualism of universally-held individual rights. 
The accused can stand apart, distant from the process as he or 
she is being expelled from the community. Our ordinary criminal 
procedures push suspects into the freedom that comes from being 
forced into isolation in the name of individual rights. The rights of 
juveniles as currently understood render them especially isolated, 
adjudicated in private and secret proceedings. Accountability to the 
victim and to the harmed communities is directly contrary to the 
privacy-and isolation-of current juvenile processes. 
The isolated trickster of current constitutional criminal 
procedure is not the only concept of an autonomous person we can 
imagine. Strip away entrenched concepts of the accused's 
constitutional protections lying primarily in the opportunity to 
145. On this negative liberty of dominant constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., Susan 
Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271 (1990); David 
Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864 (1986); ROBIN 
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 109-10 (1994). 
146. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
147. See e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (applying the due process requirement 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to juvenile delinquency adjudications). 
148. See Ann Althouse, Standing in Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1177 (1991). 
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attempt to avoid responsibility. 
The tired concept of autonomous individuals fundamentally 
needing and seeking a state of separation from others ignores the 
equally central human goal of being connected. Feminist scholars, 
including, most prominently in the legal academy, Robin West, offer 
the central insight that perhaps a human struggle to be in relationship 
is as great a need for full personhood as the liberal concept of the 
right to be left alone.149 To be fully human is to be in relationship. 
We are trying to be connected. Perhaps in the context of wrongdoing, 
being connected is being accountable. 
What would restorative liberty look like? The fundamental 
fairness principle of due process could be understood to be the 
fundamental fairness of not isolating the accused from the 
community, but instead offering the chance to be held responsible 
and to make amends. Any meaningful restorative justice process 
engages the offender instead of expelling him or her. In many ways, 
the individual accused loses the right to isolation, but instead is 
compelled into accountability to his or her victim and community. 
This can be deeply invasive and demanding. But it is the kind of 
demand we make of people with whom we have some sort of 
relationship. It is the kind of demand that we make of ourselves. 
Belonging in a community means some amount of acknowledgement 
and even respect for others.1so Personhood means being responsible to 
the community in which one lives. Autonomy need not mean being 
alone.1s1 Being responsible to others for one's own actions is a crucial 
part of autonomy.152 Being responsible is part of growing up.153 
149. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 28 (1988) 
("Women's concept of value revolves not around the axis of autonomy, individuality, 
justice and rights, as does men's, but instead around the axis of intimacy, nurturance, 
community, responsibility and care."); see generally ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 
(1997). 
150. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1012 ("Respect for others would seem to require that 
when an offender has hurt someone, she should apologize to the extent that she feels at 
fault."). 
151. See, e.g., GRACE CLEMENT, CARE, AUTONOMY, AND JUSTICE (1996). 
"[A]utonomy cannot be achieved individually. In fact, we learn to become autonomous, 
and we learn this competency not through isolation from others, but through relationships 
with others. An individual's autonomy is nurtured through the care of others." [d. at 24. 
152. "In taking responsibility for one's decisions, one is autonomous." [d.; see also 
Cohen, supra note 16, at 1021. "Within many religious and ethical systems, offering an 
apology for one's wrongdoing is an important part of moral behavior, as is forgiving those 
who have caused offense." [d. (footnote omitted). 
153. Cf. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1010 (noting that attorneys rarely counsel their 
clients to apologize, but "[i]f apology is often in the best interest of children, could it often 
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When something has gone wrong, when we have failed, when we 
have injured someone else, suppressing that is a sign of bad mental, 
emotional, and moral health. But the constitutional protections of 
the criminal adversary system offer the defendant denial and 
suppression. We might prefer community and accountability to 
isolation and denia1.154 Is there any such thing as liberty in the 
protection of being held accountable? In a sense, it is the liberty 
interest in being respected. It is the liberty interest in being seen, and 
recognized as ourselves. It is the liberty interest in being understood 
to be a member of the community. ISS 
Although this vision of the liberty in relationship, responsibility 
and restoration is utterly contrary to current constitutional criminal 
procedures, our Constitution provides several potential sources for its 
support. Perhaps restorative justice requires a re-emphasis on the 
meaning and primacy of the first three words of the Constitution, 
"We, the People," as articulating a group identity and commitment to 
community that is the foundation of all that follows. The repUblican 
foundations of our constitution-especially the republican emphasis on 
engaged deliberation-support the Restorative Constitution.ls6 Almost 
hidden behind the prominent isolated and individualistic defensive 
rights of constitutional criminal procedure are several significant 
guarantees of connection between the accused and his or her 
community, including the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a 
Grand Jury for capital or infamous crimes and the Sixth Amendment 
rights to a public trial and an impartial jury. Interestingly, by its 
literal language the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
guarantees the right of an accused "to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him," language that in some ways suggests the 
confrontation with the victim that is the heart of restorative justice 
conferences.IS7 
be in the best interest of adults?"). 
154. Cf. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1022 (stating that the "spiritual and psychological 
benefits [of apologizing] may be central to a client's well-being, especially in the long run" 
(footnote omitted)). 
155. Cf. Currie, supra note 145, at 867-68 (discussing arguments for defining positive 
liberty); WEST, supra note 145, at 149-51 (promoting First Amendment protection of 
communication, not expression, as protecting community, not individual values). 
156. See BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 27; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 57-
85. 
157. U.S. CONST. amend VI. One of the most significant modem aspects of the 
Confrontation Clause is the right of the accused to confront his or her accusers through 
cross-examination. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). But the language of the 
Sixth Amendment is focused more clearly on the witness confronting the defendant, not 
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Liberty-based concepts of personhood and individuation might 
also provide some way to recognize the potential freedom and liberty 
in being personally accountable, and challenged to offer redress, in 
the service of community. In contrast to the constitutional criminal 
protections that permit the accused to remain and hidden and 
removed, the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized 
consideration of a capital defendant prior to imposition of a death 
sentence158 promotes an unusually prominent and robust concept of 
the personhood of the criminal defendant. In Woodson v. North 
Carolina/59 the Court held that North Carolina's mandatory capital 
sentencing scheme violated the Eighth Amendment in part because 
of "its failure to allow the particularized consideration of relevant 
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant 
before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death."l60 Woodson 
thus stands as a monument against faceless, undifferentiated 
defendants. 
But the Woodson principle of individuation is recognized in the 
context of a capital defendant's right to be presented as a full human 
being in order to convince a jury to spare his life. My argument 
moves in the opposite direction. Is there an interest of an accused in 
being considered as a full human being for reasons other than to 
reduce punishment? Is it possible to conceive of protecting 
personhood by holding a criminal defendant accountable? Is it an 
aspect of liberty to be held accountable for the injuries one inflicts, 
rather than to be removed from the community? Conceiving of such 
a liberty interest is almost, but not quite, impossible. Developing that 
conception of liberty will be the key to making the Restorative 
the defendant challenging the witness. 
158. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 303. "A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the 
character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular 
offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the 
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of 
humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely 
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be 
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death." !d. at 304. In Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586 (1978), following Woodson, the Court held, "the concept of individualized 
sentencing in criminal cases generally, although not constitutionally required, has long 
been accepted in the country." Id. at 602. "[W]here sentencing discretion is granted, it 
generally has been agreed that the sentencing judge's 'possession of the fullest information 
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics' is '[h]ighly relevant-if not 
essential-[to the] selection of an appropriate sentence .... ", Id. at 602-03 (quoting 
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949». 
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Constitution real. 
B. The Victim: Given a Restorative Voice 
A crime is a public wrong, which is understood to mean that the 
victim has no formal place in criminal law. The Constitution as 
currently conceived offers nothing to the victim of crime. The 
interests of the community, including the victim, are represented by 
the state, or "The People." 
The Restorative Constitution could draw on the work of 
theorists who argue for a Constitution of affirmative duties, including 
the duty to protect individuals not just from the harms inflicted by the 
state, but also from harms inflicted by private entities.161 In the 
criminal adversary system, rights of victims are non-existent in part 
because they are directly opposed to the constitutionally-protected 
rights of the criminal defendant, and in part because the victim is 
legally a stranger to the proceedings. 
A restorative process in which the offender and the victim are 
not completely or finally in opposition permits the victim a role and 
authority without necessarily diminishing the rights of the offender. 
Indeed, restorative justice processes can be understood as a 
collaboration between the victim and the offender and their 
respective supporters. In this context, acknowledging the interests of 
the victim strengthens rather than hurts the offender. 
The structure of an adversarial contest between the state and an 
accused requires that the victim be an outsider to the process. 
Communitarian and relational goals suggest that leaving the victim at 
the periphery is a serious weakness of our adversarial criminal justice 
system, that the community should take seriously the injury to the 
victim, and that the state should not completely appropriate the 
injury for societal goals. Restorative justice programs delegate 
substantial authority to the victim to propose conditions by which the 
offender may make amends. Of course, any delegation of authority to 
victims to impose sanctions runs counter to our deeply held concepts 
of the value of "neutral," disengaged decisionmakers.162 The tradition 
of neutral, professional decisionmakers is especially entrenched in 
juvenile courts, where judges, not juries, choose the controlling story. 
We trust neutral, distanced decisionmakers, especially in juvenile 
court, but perhaps engaged decisionmakers could offer better 
161. See, e.g., Robin West, Constitutional SkeptiCism, 72 B.U. L. REv. 765 (1992). 
162 See Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to KilL' Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed 
to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345, 1381. 
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outcomes in certain circumstances. Restorative justice offers the 
promise of presenting both victim and offender as complex 
individuals with multiple identities and valuable community ties.l63 
C. The Community: Embodied and Empowered 
Our Constitution embodies liberal notions of individual rights 
and autonomy values, with recognition of group rights or community 
values noticeably absent, especially within the context of criminal 
procedure. Restorative justice has a goal of involving members of the 
community in understanding and redressing the harm caused by 
criminal acts. But what is the community we are talking about?l64 
The unformed notion of the community is probably the most 
romanticized aspect of restorative justice,165 and perhaps of our 
current criminal justice strategies as well.166 Defining the relevant 
community with some precision and giving it real authority is surely 
the key to nonsubordinating167 and effectivel68 restorative justice. A 
163. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 67 ("Peacemaking does not demand that women 
choose their identity as 'battered women' over other competing identities."); Meyer, supra 
note 45, at 1524 (stating that the victim's forgiveness requires that "the victim herself be a 
member of the community"). 
164. See Brown, supra note 7, at 1292 (challenging victim offender mediation as 
invoking the interests of undefined or nonexistent communities); Harris, Environmental 
Justice, supra note 41, at 1 (invoking model of environmental justice engagement with 
community; questioning the location or identification of "community"). 
165. Donna Coker asks aptly, "[w]hy is it that we trust communities in the context of 
restorative justice processes to invalidate the social beliefs that underpin battering 
behavior more than we trust other community representatives like judges, police, and 
juries?" Coker, supra note 19, at 96-97. Kathleen Daly asks "whether victim advocacy as 
a vision of bottom up social transformation of law and social institutions will inevitably fall 
victim to a more conservative law-and-order victim-centered advocacy." Daly, supra note 
46, at 780; see Stuart A. Scheingold, Toska Olson, & Jana Pershing, Sexual Violence, 
Victim Advocacy, and Republican Criminology: Washington State's Community Protection 
Act, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 729 (1994) (using Washington data to suggest inconsistencies 
between victims' goals and reintegrative principles). 
166. See, e.g., Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1102-03 Qustifying anti-gang public nuisance 
injunction on the basis of protection of "the community"). 
167. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 19, at 97 (suggesting that community engagement, 
coupled with acknowledgement of community responsibility, could provide context and 
process for addressing structural disparities in power of participants in Peacemaking); 
Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy, and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 410 
(2000) (citing evidence of restorative justice programs facilitating "microcommunity 
building"). 
168. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 1292 (arguing that mediation works best in stable 
social systems such as village and pastoral societies); Coker, supra note 19, at 98 (noting 
the normative community for Navajo Peacemaking is relatively clear); McCold, supra note 
38, at 91 (arguing that the nature of the community in restorative justice processes is 
always "depend[ent] on the nature of the conflict"); McCold, supra note 38, at 92 
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concrete, authoritative role for members of diverse and diffused 
communities is especially important in light of the racialized criminal 
justice system.169 A process that enables those closest to the crime, 
both through proximity to the victim and proximity to the offender, to 
participate in shaping the state's response, moves the role of the 
community from the purely rhetorical to the real. 
In abstract terms, typical juvenile and criminal justice 
mechanisms are located within communities, both in terms of 
geography and of constitutional structure and justification. The 
community is represented in criminal justice through the range of 
normal democratic mechanisms that control the government. The 
police powers of the state rest in part upon the obligation to protect 
the community, and our justice systems are justified by the need to 
meet that goal. The fundamental concept of a crime as a public--not 
personal--wrong means that some concept of community animates 
criminal and juvenile proceedings. The "community" is well 
represented in theory, "by not only the prosecutor, but also the judge 
and the jury-all different embodiments of the state. 
The accused is at risk of being cast out of the community; thus 
the community is understood to be in opposition to the accused. The 
community is present in this very negative, exclusionary sense, as an 
entity that, manifested by the prosecutor, representing the People, is 
known to be judging and attempting to expel the accused. In some 
sense, then, the community is well represented under the current 
system. 
In other ways, the community is absent. The community is either 
narrowly represented by the state's representatives-prosecutor and 
judge and perhaps jurors-or by broad, ungrounded references to 
"the People." The exact membership of "the People" is unclear; in 
literal terms, "the People" seems to include everyone in the 
jurisdiction except the accused, who is the formal adversary of the 
People. This formal structure undermines the community 
involvement that might otherwise be found from the presence of a 
(focusing on "local community"); McCold, supra note 38, at 94-95 (focusing on community 
responsibility). But see Martha Minow, Between Intimates and Between Nations: Can Law 
Stop the Violence?, 50 CASE W. RES. 851, 865 n. 54 (2000) (noting that "the presence of a 
sufficiently coherent and engaged community to have the capacity to reintegrate a 
wrongdoer" is "precisely what is lacking" in "many circumstances of contemporary 
violence"). 
169. Cf. Roberts, supra note 51, at 821 (noting that an important part of Black 
liberation is an "increase [in] Black citizens' participation in constructing responses to 
crime"); id. at 801 (criticizing the false dichotomy between law-abiding and lawless, and 
the notion that police can tell them apart). 
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victim, or a family member of the accused. As discussed above, in 
formal terms the victim is simply a member of the People, as is, for 
example, the accused's mother. The very abstract nature of the 
community's presence, mediated by formal state structures, erases a 
meaningful sense of community from criminal and juvenile justice 
systems. . 
Any movement away from our current criminal justice 
mechanisms, with these highly formal and diffused notions of 
community, toward a system of concrete community presence 
through the actual participation of community members, raises 
potential constitutional concerns. The community is represented in 
restorative justice programs by the moderator or mediator, by both 
the victim and the accused, and by supporters of both. Although 
nobody elected any of them to have any crime response function, the 
constitutional issue of formal authority is easily answered by routine 
mechanisms of delegation, such as through legislation authorizing 
restorative justice programs. 
The concrete community engagement in restorative justice 
processes also has constitutional support in the structural themes of 
deliberative democracy.17o The jury is the symbol of democracy within 
the criminal justice system, but most adults accused of crime today 
never see a jury,171 and juvenile courts protect youthful offenders by 
eliminating juries.172 Restorative Constitutional processes arguably 
promise nothing less than to make republicanism real,173 and to 
replenish deliberative democracy for communities, victims, and 
offenders. 
Conclusion 
My willingness to risk much potential procedural protection in 
170. Cf. AKIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES (1997) (calling for interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments 
in light of the structure of the Constitution as a whole). 
171. Nancy King reminds us that "for most defendants, the jury, if not irrelevant, is at 
least inaccessible." King, supra note 119, at 141. Only 3-10% of felony cases go to trial, 
and of those, more than one-third are adjudicated by a judge without a jury. Id; see also 
Fisher, supra note 119, at 857 ("Bloodlessly and clandestinely, [plea bargaining] has swept 
across the penal landscape and driven our vanquished jury into small pockets of 
resistance"). 
172. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (denying to juveniles any 
constitutional right to jury trials in delinquency proceedings, relying on the purported 
differences between juvenile courts' treatment and criminal courts' punishment). 
173. See generally BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 27. 
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the name of restorative justice is based, in part, on the recognition 
that the actual protections of our individual rights systems are illusory 
for many Americans.174 The Acuna decision upholding the anti-gang 
public nuisance injunction in Rocksprings supports my skepticism 
about unequal access to constitutional rights. Like many other 
judicial decisionmakers, members of the California Supreme Court 
believe that they know who is in the community, and who is in the 
gang. Race, gender, and class form the basis of that knowledge. 
Those constructed group identities are so strong that even in the 
context of a constitutional system relentlessly based on defensive 
individual rights, the Acuna decision sacrifices the right to be held 
accountable for one's own acts in the name of the needs of "the 
community." The frightening group identity of gang members seems 
to wipe out entitlement to ordinary individual rights. 
In many ways, the anti-gang public nuisance injunction is an 
extreme example of an attempt to control violence through the 
formal power of law. The injunction claims to punish and reduce 
gang criminality by making virtually any activity by gang members 
illegal. The legal document defining the gang to be a public nuisance 
as a matter of law exalts the formality of law over practical reality. 
Restorative justice relates to the law in the opposite direction. 
Restorative justice starts with the injuries and the people involved, 
and shifts the ground of engagement away from the formal processes 
of law. The risks in such a shift are high. But the current criminal 
and juvenile justice systems are seriously destructive of the interests 
of the victims, the communities, and the offenders. Restorative 
justice offers the possibility that We, the People, can do better. 
174. See Delgado, supra note 36, at 771-72. 
